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Moderator: 
"WILL SAD DAM HUSSEIN GET A FAIR TRIAL?"* 
Debate betweenDr. Curtis F. J. Doebbler 
and Professor-Michael P. Scharf 
Hiram E. Chodosh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
School of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Participants: 
Professor Dr. Curtis F.J. Doebbler, international human rights lawyer, Pro-
fessor of Law at An-Najah National University in Nablus, Palestine, and 
member of legal team representing Saddam Hussein, and 
Professor Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick 
K. Cox International Law Center, Case School of Law 
ASSOCIATE DEAN HIRAM Cl!ODOSH:. 
I'm Hiram Chodosh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs for the 
School of Law at Case Western Reserve University. On behalf of the Fre-
derick K. Cox International Law Center and the War Crimes Research of-
fice, welcome. 
The Cox Center is dedicated to advancing understanding and solutions 
to the most critical issues of global justice. The Center supports innovative, 
educational programs, including a concentration of thirty-five courses, ex-. 
periential and service learning, and our clinics, labs, and externships and 
study-abroad programs, cutting-edge research through symposia on terror-
ism, the Middle East, intellectual property, nation-building, and many other 
issues, and service to the broader community. 
Today's debate, "The Hussein Trial on Trial," kicks off the Cox Cen-
. ter' s newest program, the International Debate Series, which will feature an 
annual debate between leading experts on an important and timely issue of 
international law. 
• Sponsored by the Case Western Reserve University Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center on Thursday, January 13,2005. The debate was broadcast nationally on C-SPAN on 
January 29,2005: <http://www.C-span store.org/shop/index.php?main_page=product_ 
video_info&cPath=18_19&products_id+l84702-l>. 
21 
. I 
22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 37:21 
Before we begin, a few points of background. As you know, on De-
cember 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council approved a statute establish-
ing the Iraqi Special Tribunal for crimes against humanity, and Paul 
Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, signed the statute 
into law. 
The tribunal is charged with the responsibility to prosecute those ac-
cused of crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide in Iraq between July 17, 1968, when Iraqi President Saddam Hus-
sein's Ba'ath Party seized power, and May 1st, 2003, when President Bush . 
declared the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq. U.S. forces 
captured Saddam Hussein only four days after the establishment of the tri-
bunal on December 14th, 2003. 
On July 1, 2004, Saddam Hussein was arraigned before an investigat-
ing judge and informed of the allegations, including: the systematic killing 
of religious figures in 1974; two, killing off the Kurdish Barzani clan in 
1983; three, torturing and killing members of political parties over the last 
thirty years; four, using chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja in 
1988; five, the Anfal ethnic cleansing campaign against Kurds between 
1987 and 1988; six, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait; and seven, drying rivers, 
killing hundreds of thousands of Marsh Arabs in response to their 1991 up-
rising. 
The U.S. involvement in the tribunal, the statute, and the selection of 
judges, the absence of international jurists, the fear of violence against inex-
perienced Iraqi judges and witnesses, the isolation of Hussein under heavily 
guarded detention, the availability of the death penalty, the emerging civil 
war, the collective conviction ofthe former Iraqi regime in the court of pub-
lic opinion, all raise a central question: Can Saddam Hussein get a fair trial 
before the Iraqi Special Tribunal? 
During the next hour, our own Professor Michael Scharf, Director of 
the Cox Center, founder of the War Crimes Research Office and Adviser to 
the Iraqi Special Tribunal; and Professor Curtis Doebbler, a leading human 
rights expert, one of two Americans, the other being former Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark, who are defending Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal, will debate this issue. Doebbler will argue that Saddam 
Hussein cannot get a fair trial before the Tribunal. Scharf will refute this 
claim. 
These two leading experts do not sit neatly in their respective adversar-
ial positions. When he first learned of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Scharf 
wrote that it will be viewed as a puppet of the occupying power, and Doeb-
bler has spent most of his career representing the interests of people, includ-
ing over two million people in the Sudan, subjected to human rights abuses. 
Both are committed human rights experts; both seek justice for the Iraqi 
people and the broader international community. Each is here to contribute, 
albeit through heated disagreement to our appreciation of these critical is-
sues . 
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The debate format today is simple. Each side, beginning with 
Professor Doebbler, will have fifteen minutes to make his argument. 
Professor Doebbler will then have three minutes to rebut Professor Scharf's 
argument, and the remaining time we will take four questions from the au-
dience, two directed at Scharf and two for Doebbler. Each will be allowed 
two minutes to answer the question and one minute to comment on the re-
sponse to the other's answer. You have been provided forms to write your 
questions down during the debate. If you have a question, please raise your 
form in the air, and they will be collected by our student assistants and 
brought to me for selection. The same process applies to those of you who 
are viewing the debate upstairs from our overflow room. Please supply . 
your name and write clearly. And now, Professor Doebbler, you have fif-
teen minutes. 
PROFESSOR CURTIS DOEBBLER: 
Thank you very much. I want to thank Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity for being willing to host such a debate like this. There have been many 
other places that have shied away from discussing this issue although I think 
it is a very vital issue for human rights and, as I will try to indicate, a very 
vital issue for the values that underlie our society here in the United States. 
So I want to thank them very much, and to thank particularly Professor 
Scharf for being willing to join me in this forum. 
The first issue that has to be addressed is the fact that this wliole situa-
tion, the trials, what is happening right now in Iraq, the military involve-
ment, the soldiers that are being killed, the civilians that are being killed, the 
destruction of Fallujah, all this has taken place in violation of international 
law. I have been to more than sixty countries after the invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003, and I have not met one lawyer with whom I had to argue about 
the illegality of the invasion, except in the United States. In every other 
country I visited, and meeting with some ofthe heads of state ofthose coun-
tries and some of their most senior lawyers, they were unequivocally con-
vinced that the United States' aggression against Iraq was a violation of 
international law, a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which represents binding international law for the United States. 
So we have to look at it from that perspective. 
In other words, think about it as if another country came to the United 
States, decided it didn't like President Bush and the Republicans in power 
because they thought that President Bush was a war criminal for having 
committed crimes of aggression against other countries, invaded the United 
States, and then put him on trial claiming that they would give him a fair 
trial. That is the situation right now that we face in Iraq. And I think it is 
important for us not to lose sight of that, the crucial starting point is the ille-
gal use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of 
another sovereign country in violation of international law. 
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Furthermore, even today, some would say that there is still an ongoing 
use of force against the people of Iraq and there is certainly an occupation 
of large parts of Iraq. This occupation is an illegal occupation, in part, be-
cause it was based on an illegal use of force, in part, because it is an occupa-
tion by a foreign power that has acted oppressively in the areas that it 
occupies. 
So the second important aspect to understand is that Iraq, at least large 
parts of the country, are in a state of occupation. Legally, that means that 
there is law that applies to an occupier and how an occupier can treat the 
people of a country, how it can treat the institutions of a country, and in 
Iraq, the United States, I suggest, has not abided by this law. 
In fact, part of that law, the Fourth Geneva Convention, states that an 
occupying power may not dissolve the judicial bodies of a country and insti-
tute its own judicial bodies. The United States has dissolved the judicial 
institutions of Iraq, and it has instated its own judges. 
Yes, many of these judges were taken from among Iraqi judges, but 
only after Iraqi judges were politically vetted to decide which ones should 
stay. And they did not vet them for their legal competence; no, they vetted 
them in a process they called de-Ba'athification, a process to which every 
single one of the judges was subjected because ever single judge in Iraq, 
with maybe an insignificant number of exceptions, were members of the 
Ba'ath Party. 
In fact, the most senior judges in Iraq were senior members of the 
Ba'ath Party. These judges were excluded from the judiciary. It is not a 
huge number, 180 of maybe 900 judges, but they are the most senior judges. 
The judges that are left are some of the most junior judges. Some of them 
were not even judges before, and now they have been made, by essentially 
decree, judges. These are the individuals who will be part of the court. 
Now, I'd like to go through each judge's background and say this is the 
judge who is going to be in the court, and these are his qualifications or lack 
of qualifications. But I cannot do that. I cannot do that because I don't 
know who the judges are of that court. I know one person who is an inves-
tigating judge ~mly because a television tape of the initial appearance in July 
leaked out, but that should not have even been made public according to the 
American authorities, and that person is a very junior judge, not a very sen-
ior judge. 
So we have a situation where the occupying power has created a tribu-
nal of, in our opinion, less than competent judges that will be trying one of 
the most complex and possibly one of the most important cases in recent 
history. Certainly, I think that is inappropriate, but more importantly, I 
think that is a breach of international law guarantees of a fair, competent, 
independent, and impartial tribunal. 
The court is not independent because it is created by an occupying 
power through a process by which the judges are chosen based not on their 
legal qualifications but on a political vetting. The court is not impartial 
prima facie in the words of the State Department, commenting on South 
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American countries, because faceless judges are prima facie, an illegitimate 
form of judiciary. And they violate the provisions of due process in a vari-
ety ofways. 
If there is to be a court in Iraq that tries individuals for international 
crimes, such a court must have the authority to try every individual who has 
committed a crime against international law in Iraq. That includes crimes of 
aggression, which are not included in the statute right now, despite what 
you heard about some of the allegations -- and I will come to that in a sec-
ond -- that includes being able to try the nationals of other countries that 
may have committed these crimes. 
Probably not many of you are old enough to remember, but one of the 
greatest criticisms leveled at the Nuremberg and Tokyo processes after 
World War II by one of the judges who participated in that process, Judge 
Rollings, a Dutch judge ofthe Tokyo tribunal, was that that process was not 
legitimate because it was only "victor's justice" and in his words, that is, 
"not justice at all." 
If we are going to have a system of the rule oflaw applied to Iraq if the 
occupying power and, hopefully, eventually, a sovereign Iraqi Government 
that represents the people of Iraq is going to deal with issues in their country 
that require a judiciary to deal with them, we need to have a fair judiciary 
established in that country. We do not have that right now. 
I want to go through some of the due process rights that are being vio-
lated and that need to be respected in this instance. I mentioned some of 
them already, and because many of you are law students, I will point out, 
although not with the jurisprudence, we don't have time for that here, at 
least some of the provisions of international law, which are relevant. 
For example, many of you know that Article 14 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights provides for a competent, independ-
ent, and impartial tribunal. This right is also provided for in the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which although not a binding 
treaty on the United States, has been accepted many times by the Inter-
American Commission as reflecting customary international law that the 
United States must abide by, and those of you who studied constitutional 
law are certainly aware that the United States courts have said that custom-
ary international law is part ofUnited States law. 
Also, the Geneva Conventions, Article 84, subparagraph 2 of the Third 
Geneva Convention specifically, contains the right to be judged by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal. 
One also has a right to be informed of the charges against him in a 
timely manner. That is in both the Third Geneva Convention, Article 104, 
and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights article 14, sub-
paragraph 3(a). The right to be informed of charges against you is not the 
right to stand before somebody who points at you and says "We think you 
have done many bad things," or to even come before one who rails against 
you based on his perception of what might be public values. 
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It is the right to come before a court where you are presented with a 
prima facie case of facts against you and where you are able to reply to 
those facts, and most importantly, it is a chance to understand what provi-
sions of law you have violated. 
I don't know if any of you have seen -- I have watched it numerous 
times as you can imagine -- the process which took place apparently in 
Baghdad at the beginning of July 2004. Not one provision of law was men-
tioned in relation to any charges. In fact, at one point, the judge held up the 
law, and said that this is the basis of the establishment of the tribunal and 
the President replied that he was holding up the criminal law that was 
signed into law by the President. 
The judge didn't even have the sense to open the book he was holding, 
and look at that criminal law and cite some of its provisions. That in my 
view -- and I think the view of any criminal lawyer -- is a travesty of justice. 
If you are brought before a criminal tribunal in this country, I hope that they 
will cite a provision of law that you have violated in any indictment or 
allegations against you. 
I will not go through all of the due process rights. There are more than 
20 rights that have been violated, but because of time, I just want to point 
out one or two important ones, particularly one that is important to myself 
as one of the counsel for the individual concerned, and that is the right to be 
able to have contact with a lawyer and not just any lawyer, not like in Guan-
tanamo, where the state decides who your lawyers are. 
I represent some individuals in Guantanamo Bay as well, and do you 
know what the Government told me? If I wanted to see those individuals, I 
have to sign an agreement stating that I would essentially tell the Govern-
ment anything that was mentioned in my communications between them. 
That is an inappropriate manner for the government to respect somebody's 
right to legal counsel. 
This right requires a defendant be able to consult with legal counsel of 
his own choosing and to be able to consult in confidence, and to be able to 
facilitate a defense. 
Seeing that the time is running out, let me just end here because as you 
can see, it takes quite a long time just to get through the basic principles 
being violated in this case -- but let me just conclude by mentioning that it is 
not only Iraqis from whom we are setting a bad example by disrespecting or 
ignoring the rule of law, but it is a important to all of you in this room, or at 
least those of you who are lawyers, because the law is based on respect for 
the law and respect for the rule of law for everybody equally. Thank you. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
Thank you, Professor Doebbler. 
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PROFESSOR MICHAEL SCHARF: 
Let me begin by thanking Mr. Curtis Doebbler for coming to Cleveland 
this morning, braving the winds of the Chicago Airport to make it here for 
this nationally televised debate. We actually met on line. After I had writ-
ten a piece entitled "Can this Man Get a Fair Trial," which appeared in the 
Washington Post Outlook Section a few weeks ago, there was a Washington 
Post online discussion, in which Mr. Doebbler wrote, "Dear Michael: I 
have followed your online chat with interest, even encouraging some of my 
volunteers to participate. Rather than debate your many wrong or mislead-
ing statements on line, I would like to invite you to debate me in person. 
Maybe the Washing Post would sponsor such a debate or maybe even your 
law school. As you undoubtedly are aware, I am one of the lawyers for Mr. 
Saddam Hussein, and I am intimately familiar with the proceedings in the 
case. Best regards, Curtis Doebbler." 
I wrote back "Dear Curtis: I would enjoy very much a public debate 
with you. Would you have any interest in coming to Case Western Reserve 
University for such an event?" And here we are now. 
The other thing I want to do is provide a disclaimer. Although I was 
one of five experts from around the world selected by the Department of 
Justice Regime Crimes Liaison Office in Baghdad to help train the IST 
judges, I must stress I do not speak for the Iraqi Special Tribunal or the De-
partment of Justice, and I have not received any fmancial compensation for 
my assistance. I am assisting the IST because I feel very strongly that this 
will be one of the most important trials of our lifetime, and I want to make 
sure that this trial complies fully with international human rights standards. 
Now, let me begin by responding to Mr. Doebbler's attempt to link the 
issue of the validity of the invasion in 2003 with the question of the legiti-
macy of the Iraqi Special Tribunal process. 
First of all, the Security Council of the United Nations, representing all 
the countries in the world, recognized in Resolution 1546 that the occupa-
tion ended and the Iraqi Interim Government was sovereign as of June 30, 
2004. It bas recognized the legitimacy of the Iraqi Interim Government, as 
well as the process for democratic elections to be held at the end of this 
month. Further, in calling for accountability for violations of international 
humanitarian law, the Security Council made a distinction between what 
many countries feel was an unauthorized invasion and the issue of what to 
do next. 
Secondly, if the democratically elected Government of Iraq approves 
the statute and the judges of this tribunal, there would be no issue of a viola-
tion of the Geneva Conventions because that would severe any argument 
that this was a statute and a court that was set up solely by an occupying 
Government.' The new Iraqi Government could do this indirectly by ap-
proving the funding for the IST and continuing its operations, including the 
construction of its facilities, the issuance of indictments, the conduct of in-
vestigations, and the commencement of trials. 
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And third, Mr. Doebbler's argument smacks of what is known in inter-
national law as the tu quo que defense. This is Latin for "you also." And it 
is a defense that the Nuremberg defendants raised sixty years ago; it is a 
defense Milosevic has raised at his trial before the Yugoslavia Tribunal in 
The Hague, and it is almost always raised by former leaders accused of war 
crimes. International courts have always dismissed this defense as invalid. 
In doing so, they say it is true that in wars and in foreign affairs many 
countries violate international law, but when a tribunal is set up to prosecute 
defendants, the only question is: were these defendants guilty of the crimes 
charged? And the fact that opposing leaders may have also violated interna-
tional law or committed war crimes does not excuse the guilt of these de-
fendants. Therefore, the tu quo que defense is not a valid defense. It may 
resonate as a television sound bite, but legally, it doesn't hold water. 
Now, with respect to judging the legitimacy of the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal, there is international precedent that gives us a guide for making this 
determination and that comes out of the Yugoslavia Tribunal set up by the 
UN Security Council in 1993. In its first judgment, lmown as the Tadic 
case, the Tribunal ruled on whether it was validly established and what it 
means to be a legitimate tribunal. The Yugoslavia Tribunal focused on 
three criteria: 
First of all, international law requires that a war crimes tribunal be es-
tablished by a statute, not just executive fiat. There has to be some control-
ling document. Well, the Iraqi Special Tribunal does have a statute. It is 
interesting to most people who have read that statute that it looks an awful 
lot like the statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal. 
Secondly, the Yugoslavia Tribunal said that to be legitimate a war 
crimes tribunal has to be independent from the executive and legislative 
branches. Now, according to the Iraqi Special Tribunal, it is independent. 
The judges are specifically prohibited from taking direction from the Iraqi 
Government or US Government. The president and the legislature of Iraq 
cannot control the Iraqi Special Tribunal much like our legislature and 
president can't control our own courts. 
For evidence that theIST is independent in fact as well as on paper, I 
point out that Provisional Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, who is running for 
election, has been saying on the campaign trail that the trial of Saddam Hus-
sein and Chemical Ali must start imminently. And there is quite a bit of 
pressure from him and others who would like to see these trials commence 
as soon as possible. But the Iraqi Special Tribunal said "no, the trials can-
not start because we do not yet have our rules of procedure; the defense 
counsel has not had time to prepare their case; and we will not and shall not 
be bullied by the executive branch because we are independent," proving, in 
fact, that the IST meets the second criterion. 
And third, the Yugoslavia Tribunal said that war crimes tribunals have 
to comply with fundamental norms of due process, which are enumerated 
in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as Mr. Doebbler mentioned. 
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Next, Mr. Doebbler attacked the fairness of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
process, and I believe in assessing the fairness of any tribunal we have to 
ask three questions: First, are there fair procedures? Second, are there im-
partial judges? And third, is there equality of arms between the defense 
counsel and the prosecution? 
With respect to the first of these factors, fair procedures, those are set 
out in Article 20 of the Iraqi Special Tribunal statute, which is modeled on 
the Yugoslavia Tribunal statute and the Rwanda Tribunal statute. The due 
process protections include the presumption of innocence; the right to be 
informed promptly and in detail of the charges and to have adequate time 
and facilities to prepare a defense and to communicate freely with counsel 
of choice; the right to be tried without undue delay; the right to be present 
during trial and to appointment of counsel; the right to have counsel present 
during questioning; the right to examine and confront witnesses; the right 
against self-incrimination and not to have silence taken into account in de-
termining guilt; and the right to disclosure by the Prosecution of exculpatory 
evidence, and witness statements; and the right to appeal. These rights will 
be further elaborated upon in the rules of procedure of the Iraqi Special Tri-
bunal, which should be coming out after the elections and very soon. 
There has been a lot written in the press criticizing the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal, saying things like it will allow torture evidence to come in. In 
fact, that is the kind of thing that will be specifically addressed in the rules 
of procedure, and it is premature to try to allege that that such evidence will 
be allowed now when we have not yet seen the rules of procedure publicly. 
Those who have been working behind the scenes on the rules of procedure 
have suggested that they will be very similar to the rules of the Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda Tribunals and will be fully in compliance with Article 14 ofthe 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 1 
Next, with respect to impartial judges, Mr. Doebbler stressed that their 
identities have been kept secret. He mentioned that the only judge the 
world has seen is the one young judge, thirty-five year old Judge Ra'id, who 
presided over Saddam Hussein's televised hearing last July, and Mr. Doeb-
bler alleged that Judge Ra'id's face was only shown because the footage 
leaked out. 
Judge Ra'id is one of the judges I got to know best in London because 
he spoke fluent English. Judge Ra'id told me the story of how his image 
was released to the world during the July 1st hearing. He told me that he 
was given the option of having his face electronically blocked out and his 
voice distorted, but he and his colleagues were so committed to the percep-
tion of fairness, that they didn't want the IST to be seen as the kind of 
1 As this issue was going to press, the Rules of Procedure ofthe IST were issued. Rule 
79 contains an exclusionary rule, requiring that the written judgments of the IST not refer to 
evidence deemed involuntary or obtained by means that cast substantial doubt on its reliabil-
ity. See <http://law.cwru.edu/war-crimes-research-portal/instant_ analysis.asp?id+ 15>. 
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hooded judges used in Chile and in Peru in the past that have been so criti-
cized by human rights organizations. 
So Judge Ra'id said he was willing to take the risk to his security to 
have his face shown to the world, and that the other judges throughout the 
trial will do the same, notwithstanding the fact that there are threats against 
them because they want to show the world how committed they are to fair-
ness. 
Now, let me say a few words about who the judges are and who they 
are not. One of the things the US public is not generally aware of is that 
Iraq was a very litigious society. There are actually 20,000 members of the 
Iraqi bar, 10,000 of which reside in Baghdad itself. Out of nine hundred 
available judges, about 150 were disqualified because they were active 
Ba'athists party members or associated with Saddam Hussein's corrupt na-
tional security courts. That left 750 judges with experience in non-political 
murder cases, assault cases, rape cases, and cases involving torts, and con-
tracts, family law, and property matters. 
The judges who were selected range in age from thirty-five for Judge 
Ra'id, who despite his youth is extremely competent; all the way up to the 
mid-sixties. And most have between fifteen and twenty years experience on 
the bench. 
Now, in London, we spent a lot of time going over the specific crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggres-
sion because these are crimes that no national judges have experience with. 
Even the distinguished jurists selected by the UN to serve on the Yugoslav-
ia Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal needed to attend training sessions to 
learn this unique area of the law. 
And I learned through these training sessions and simulations that the 
IST judges really grasped the nuances ofthis area of law. I also learned that 
they were very committed to the possibility of acquittal. They were very 
interested to learn that the Nuremberg Tribunal had acquitted three of the 
twenty-two major Nazi defendants tried after World War II, and several of 
theIST judges said "if the prosecution doesn't prove its case, we will acquit 
because we think that will prove to the world how fair this tribunal is." 
There is actually an advantage to having Iraqi judges as opposed to in-
ternational judges preside in this case. There is a myth of Nuremberg and 
the other international tribunals that the target population will think interna-
tional judges are more fair and an international tribunal's judgment more 
credible. In fact, the U.S. Government conducted opinion polls in Germany 
after Nuremberg that showed that most of the German an people, 85 to 90 
percent of them, thought that the Nuremberg trials were not legitimate, that 
the judges were not fair, and that the Nazi defendants, Goering et al., were 
not guilty. 
One might be tempted to dismiss these numbers because Nuremberg 
represented a kind of victor's justice, since the judges were from the four 
allied nations: the U.S., the U.K., Russia, and France. What about the mod-
em international war crimes tribunals? Well, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has 
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experienced the same thing. During the trial of Slobodan Milsosevic, the 
Serb people have been polled, and they say overwhelmingly that Milosevic 
is not getting a fair trial, that these international judges are not fair, and they 
don't believe that Milosevic is guilty. 
Now, if you ask the German people today if they believe in Nuremberg 
and the guilt of the Nazi leaders, they say, "yes," and there is some empiri-
cal data that suggests that these views changed in the 1960s at a point when 
the German people started having their own trials of the Nazis who had not 
been prosecuted at Nuremberg. 
And this strongly suggests that Iraqi trials by Iraqi judges are most 
likely to convince the Iraqi people of the crimes of the Ba' athist regime --
provided they are proven by credible evidence in an open and fair trial. 
Another advantage of domestic trials is that they enable defendants to 
effectively subpoena witnesses, whereas Milosevic has not been able to 
compel witnesses to testifY at his trial since the international tribunal lacks 
any type of constabulary. 
Finally, let me turn to the question of equality of arms. The fact that 
distinguished lawyers like Mr. Doebbler and Ramsey Clark are on the de-
fense team suggests that Saddam Hussein, if anything, has the stronger side 
representing him against the Iraqi prosecutors. I have no doubt that every 
single procedural issue that possibly can be raised will be raised by this su-
perb defense team which consists of over twenty of the world's most 
prominent criminal lawyers. 
Defense counsel will raise these issues in front of the five trial judges. 
They will raise them again in front of the nine appeals chamber judges, and 
Saddam Hussein will get his fair day in court. At the end of the day, if there 
is a mountain of evidence proved against him and a record is created like 
the twenty-two volumes appended to the Nuremberg judgment, I think his-
tory will look back and say that Saddam Hussein was fairly tried, although 
it was a tough case to try. I mean, obviously, when you are dealing with an 
Adolf Hitler, a Slobodan Milosevic, or a Saddam Hussein, these are espe-
cially tough cases to try fairly in the face of world public opinion. But the 
IST, I believe, is capable of bending over backwards to maintain fairness, 
and the real challenge is going to be for it to convince the rest of the world 
that the trial of Saddam Hussein was fair. Thank you. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
Professor Doebbler, you have three minutes to rebut. 
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
Thank you very much. There are so many things to reply to I don't 
know where to start because I think Mike has a very different understanding 
of the facts. 
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But I must congratulate you because some of these judges I and my 
colleagues have known for decades, and we are not able to evaluate their 
competence. After one week, you are able to determine that they will pro-
vide a fair trial. So I congratulate you sincerely on that foresight and ability 
to look into their minds. 
I must say, though, I would rather have my little sister representing me 
if she was able to have access to me, to talk with me, to bring me law books, 
to be able to facilitate some sort of defense, then even a lawyer as prestig-
ious as yourself, if they tied you up and shipped you off to Siberia and 
didn't give you any contact to me but merely said you are my lawyer, ... that 
doesn't help. It is not a matter of who represents the individual; it is a matter 
of being able to prepare a defense, and the first criteria for that is that you 
have access to the individual you represent. 
And don't take my word for it that this is an unfair trial situation. Take 
the word of a High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, 
the word of the head of the tribunal right now, the chief prosecutor of the 
tribunal in The Hague, the word of Amnesty International, they have all said 
that. 
I find somewhat whimsical this restatement, which constantly resur-
faces from journalists and others, of this tu quo que defense. It only seems 
to be the other side that mentions it. Perhaps you want to raise that defense 
for us, but it is not something right now that is even being considered by the 
defense except to listen to it from the other side. 
You may well have access to the judges. You may know who the 
judges are, but the point of due process is that -- and the point of equality of 
arms, as you pointed out -- is that the defense team and the defendant know 
these people and have access to them and have access to the evidence. 
It is very possible that there are, as the U.S. has claimed, 35,000 tons of 
evidence available. But we have not seen one ounce of that evidence, and I 
wish that one of you are sometimes put in a position -- or I should say -- I 
wish you never to be put in a position of having to defend an individual 
when you have no access to that individual and no access to any of the evi-
dence that is being used to allegedly prosecute--or maybe in this case the 
better word is persecute--that individual. 
And finally, Michael raises the issue of polls. You know, before the 
Iraqi war, a poll that was done I believe by CNN -- but you might correct 
me on that -- said that most people in the world in the United States and 
outside - believed that American President George W. Bush was a greater 
threat to peace and security than Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Maybe 
we have the wrong guy in the dock? Thank you. 
PROFESSOR SCHARF: 
Any questions? 
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ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
The first question goes to Professor Scharf: You said that you had 
changed your opinion after your interactions with the Iraqi judges but before 
you viewed this as an illegitimate tribunal. 
Not everyone has had the benefit of those interactions, and because 
perception is a key factor in determining the fairness of the tribunal, isn't it 
accurate to say that most people would view the trial as unfair, and by virtue 
of that perception, the tribunal is unfair? 
PROFESSOR SCHARF: 
I wrote a year ago in the International Bar News, a publication that 
went out to the 70,000 members of the International Bar Association, that 
because the United States had been involved in the drafting of the IST stat-
ute, because US officials were involved in selecting the IST judges, and 
because the Department of Justice would be involved in assisting the tribu-
nal, it would probably appear that the IST was a puppet court, and I was 
worried about that. And I argued that there should be international judges 
added to the IST in order to help counter that kind of perception. 
What changed my mind in London was that I found out a lot of things 
that haven't been publicly revealed about the IST, and I tried to share this 
information in my Washington Post Outlook piece a couple of weeks ago. 
The first on these was that the United States did not dictate the terms of the 
statute. In fact, the Iraqis themselves were equal players in the negotiations 
of theIST Statute, and there were certain provisions like the inclusion of the 
crime of aggression of which the United States was not in favor, that ended 
up in the statute because of the Iraqis' insistence. 
Second, I found out that the United States did not dictate the inclusion 
of the death penalty. It turned out the U.S. negotiators actually warned the 
Iraqis that including the death penalty would make it harder for the IST to 
gamer international support. But the Iraqis pointed out that Iraq has always 
had the death penalty, going back to the Code of Hammurabi, history's ear-
liest comprehensive legal text. And citing the precedent of Napoleon, they 
were extremely concerned that without the death penalty convicted leaders 
may one day return to power, as Saddam Hussein himself had done after 
being released from prison in 1968. 
Third, I found out that the Department of Justice Regime Crimes Liai-
son Office in Baghdad would be no puppet master. The office is made up 
of a half-dozen assistant U.S. attorneys from across the United Sates who 
volunteered for temporary assignment to Baghdad. The Director of the Of-
fice told me that he had been given an extraordinary amount of autonomy 
from Washington, which had decided to remain at arms length in order to · 
counter the appearance of under influence over theIST. Moreover the Of-
fice had decided to partner with the internationally respected International 
Bar Association and other NGOs, which would take the lead in organizing 
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training sessions for the judges and prosecutors. And in contrast to what I 
initially understood, the DOJ staff will not themselves be filling the advisor 
slots identified in the IST Statute. Rather, those positions will go to inde-
pendent experts from around the world selected with the help of the Interna-
tional Bar Association. 
And fmally, I've learned that the Iraqi Special Tribunal has held up to 
its independence against the prime minister's wishes that the trials proceed 
as fast as possible because the judges know that a rush to judgment would 
be a mistake. I think when the world-wide public learns of these develop-
ments, they will start to come around in their views about the IST. And 
there will be further positive developments, for example, when the rules of 
procedure are soon promulgated, and the world can see for itself that the 
1ST has embraced the highest standards of due process. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
Professor Doebbler, anything to respond? 
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
Yes. I am glad that Michael has such insight into this. We have con-
tacts with several thousands of people in Iraq, regular contacts with them, 
and we don't know many of these things. I have had the opportunity to 
meet the gentleman who claims that he drafted not only the Special Tribunal 
statute but also what is essentially the constitution of Iraq that went into 
force on the 8th of March, 2004. That gentleman is a Chicago lawyer. I 
have spent more time in Iraq in the last decade than he has. 
But more importantly, I think the point that Michael is making is not 
that relevant here. It is not a matter of what he understands about the tribu-
nal. Justice must not only be done; it must be seen to be done, and here it is 
seen to be undone. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
Professor Doebbler, we have a question from the audience. You have 
emphasized that Saddam Hussein's individual rights have been repeatedly 
violated, particularly his rights to due process. However, can you suggest 
any other legitimate means in which Mr. Hussein could have been brought 
to stand trial for the crimes which he is accused of perpetuating? If Mr. 
Hussein's individual rights are somehow superior to the rights of the mil-
lions of people affected by his actions, how can the Iraqis truly obtain the 
justice they deserve? 
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PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
I think it is a very good question about how we bring leaders to justice. 
Maybe the best way to answer that, particularly in my position representing 
somebody involved in such a matter, is by analogy. There is an individual 
that we all know who threatened the life not of just twenty-six million peo-
ple in Iraq but of fifty-two million people, if you include Afghanistan as 
well, this person is the President of this country. 
What he did, as I said, is almost unanimously understood to be a viola-
tion of international law. I think that individuals who carry out those sort of 
actions should be punished, but I think that if we are going to punish Bush 
for his crimes of aggression, for his crimes against humanity, for his war 
crimes, even arguably in the situation of Afghanistan with his statements 
about the Taliban saying first that it is a religious organization and that all 
its members should be killed, even for genocide perhaps, I think we should 
punish everybody who commits these crimes. 
But if we are going to do it in a way that is better than the people who 
commit the crimes, we must do it with respect to the rule oflaw. We must 
do it with respect to due process. We must do it before a competent, inde-
pendent, and impartial tribunal, not through some form of political vendetta, 
which is taking place right now in Iraq. 
PROFESSOR SCHARF: 
You know, for my part, I am very much a public advocate of interna-
tional tribunals when they are appropriate, but even the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court suggests that such tribunals should be a method of 
last resort and that domestic prosecution has many advantages over interna-
tional prosecution. It is better to assist a domestic system, where possible, 
to have a trial than to try to move it into the international plane. And this is 
not the first time we have seen trials like this being assisted by internation-
als. 
After the fall of the Mengistu Regime in Ethiopia, foreign lawyer 
groups assisted with the domestic war crimes trials of the Ethiopian leaders. 
And international experts are currently playing an important role in the do-
mestic war crimes trials under way in Rwanda and Bosnia -- serving as 
prosecutors, defense counsel, and even judges at the national level. But as 
Mr. Doebbler points out, it is critically important to ensure that such domes-
tic trials fully comply with international human rights standards. I think the 
IST is doing that. 
Let me just very quickly respond to the two things Mr. Doebbler said 
at the end of his rebuttal. First, with respect to access to Saddam Hussein, 
several of the defense counsel have complained publicly that they haven't 
had access to their client. Well, as of December, defense counsel got ac-
cess. The defense counsel met with Saddam Hussein, and my understanding 
is that that access will resume as soon as the IST can ensure security. 
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Second, with respect to access to evidence, I have to ask you to be pa-
tient with these initial delays. The process envisioned will be the same as 
that employed in the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal, and the 
Sierra Leone Tribunal. However, until the process is ready to commence, 
which will happen shortly after the rules of procedure are issued, the next 
steps cannot be taken. The difference here is that defendants were in cus-
tody before the Tribunal was fully operational, but once the process is in 
place, the rules of procedure will give defense the right to the evidence. 
There will be a Brady-like rule, requiring the Prosecution to turn over 
exculpatory evidence, and the defense will have many months to prepare its 
case. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
I wanted to exercise my power as moderator, and in order to be fair to 
Professor Doebbler, give him a minute to respond to that. 
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
Thank you very much. Well, I hope we will get that opportunity. But 
again, Michael, I expect you tell me in the next sentence that you are visit-
ing my client every day because you seem to know much more than I do 
about him. 
We, as defense counsel, need that opportunity. The one opportunity 
that we had-- actually, we had been told several times we would have the 
opportunity to visit our client. We were even told by Craig Kehoe, who is 
the American there sort of supporting the prosecution, that the only reason 
we couldn't meet our client was because he didn't have an Iraqi lawyer. 
Five days before, I had received a letter from Pierre Prosper, the American 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, listing our client's Iraqi lawyers. 
Something is wrong when they can't even get their own story straight. 
Consequently after a single meeting in the presence of armed guards who 
recorded everything we have not got another opportunity to meet our client. 
In fact, we have been denied that opportunity repeatedly, and we have been 
told that we will not get another opportunity to meet him. I think that is 
unfortunate. I think, in fact, that is a crime, a war crime because, as you 
know, to deny an individual a fair trial is a violation of the Geneva Conven-
tions, a grave breach. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
Thank you, Mr. Doebbler. Another question for Mr. Scl;larf from the 
audience: Isn't the exclusion of all Ba'athist judges analogous to having a 
U.S. election or a jury selection process, but let's say no Democrats able to 
vote or no Democrats able to serve on the jury? 
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PROFESSOR SCHARF: 
Well, ultimately what they excluded were the high level Ba'athist 
judges and in particular those who had served in Saddam Hussein's security 
courts, which were very similar to Adolph Hitler's courts, which were the 
subject of the academy award winning movie "Judgment at Nuremberg," 
which most people have seen. 
They did that because these judges were, in fact, tainted. They per-
verted justice and used the courts to commit crimes against humanity. Also 
excluded were jurists who had been in exile abroad. I was very happy to 
hear about that because I think those people had an axe to grind, and they 
would not be capable of fairly judging. 
The judges who were included are not just low-level traffic judges, as 
the press has unfairly reported. These are judges that have many years of 
experience with very complicated cases -- not necessarily war crimes or 
genocide, but those cases are very rare, and no judges around the world 
have experience with those until they are assigned to war crimes tribunals. 
The IST judges are people that are neither too closely affiliated with Sad-
dam Hussein nor too much opposed to him. They have been carefully vet-
ted by the Iraq Bar Association, the Provisional Government, and the De-
partment of Justice. From my time spent training and socializing with them 
in London, I can tell you that this is an incredibly bright, committed, and 
courageous group of jurists. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
Professor Doebbler? 
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
Well, instead of looking at the reflection of an individual that is sitting 
across from me with a Martini and trying to decide whether or not that indi-
vidual is an appropriate judge, I look at manifestations that are in the public 
domain, and we know that the individual they chose to head this tribunal 
initially was Salaam Chalabi, an individual who is on record saying that he 
wants to kill the individual that he is going to be trying. Would you feel 
that you are getting a fair trial if an individual who for a decade has been 
trying to kill you is the one trying you? 
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
I have one more question for Professor Doebbler: It has to do with the 
question of the invasion of Iraq: You have argued that the underlying occu-
pation, the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation, were illegal, that 
that is a strong element in making the trial unfair. When is any invasion 
illegal if there is a dictator violating his own people? 
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PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
I think an invasion is illegal when it is against a country's sovereignty, 
its territorial integrity and its political independence. Read Article 2, sub-
paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, or if you want an interpre-
tation of that, read the Nicaragua case from around 1986. 
There are a lot of bad leaders in the world. If you are going to use this 
justification, that someone is a bad person so we need to invade their coun-
try, if we were to do that, even using that based on a consensus, in this in-
stance as I have indicated the invasion would have been the other way 
around because as I said, before the invasion of Iraq,· more people thought 
George Bush was a greater threat to international peace and security than 
they thought Saddam Hussein was, and we probably know that's true now 
that they found no weapons of mass destruction, nothing that they could say 
was a smoking gun in Iraq. We invaded a country because we didn't like 
them. 
We better hope that for our foreseeable future no other country is in 
that same position and remembers our precedent and is able to invade us for 
that same reason. And unfortunately, because of the political consequence 
of what we did, there are a lot of countries that don't like us right now. 
PROFESSOR SCHARF: 
Let me just say that the difference between the 1999 NATO bombing 
campaign against Serbia to stop the genocide in Kosovo and the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq was that the emphasis in the latter case was on self-defense and 
weapons of mass destruction rather than humanitarian intervention. I would 
have been much more comfortable had the United States first pursued an 
international indictment of Saddam Hussein, and then obtained international 
approval for the invasion. I wrote as much in a Los Angeles Times Op Ed 
titled "Indict Him, Don't Just Fight Him." But this does not mean that Sad-
dam Hussein should not now be brought to justice, that there should be im-
punity for the atrocities of his regime. 
Let me take a moment to comment on the issue of Salaam Chalabi 
because I think Mr. Doebbler just kind of threw up a strawman. As most 
people know, Salaam Chalabi is no longer associated with the IST. Fur-
thermore, he was never a judge or a prosecutor. He was just the administra-
tor. His job was to do what a registrar does, and if a registrar says inflam-
matory things about the accused, I think they should be removed, but I don't 
think that shows us that this international Iraqi Special Tribunal process is 
somehow tainted. Thank you. 
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ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH: 
I am going to give Professor Doebbler one more minute to conclude, 
and I will allow Michael Scharf the last word since Professor Doebbler had 
the first. 
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER: 
I just want to stress again that this is not a situation only for the people 
of Iraq, although it is mainly for the people oflraq. We killed thousands of 
people in Iraq by our invasion of that country, and according to very reliable 
estimates, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis -- these are conservative esti-
mates -- are going to die in the next five years because of this invasion. 
That's more than died in that same period tmder Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein, even under sanctions. 
For an American audience, I also think that what we are doing is cru-
cially important because we have contradicted our own basic values first by 
invading the country contrary to international law and perhaps, even more 
importantly, by now following that up with an unfair trial-- and I hope that 
we will correct that quickly. Thank you. 
PROFESSOR SCHARF: 
Let me conclude by saying that after Nuremberg, there was hope that 
"never again" would mean something, and it didn't. Unfortunately, during 
the Cold War, we lived in an age of impunity where a person stood a better 
chance of being tried and convicted for killing one person than for killing a 
hundred thousand or a million. 
Now, luckily we now live in a new age, the dawn of accountability. 
We live in an age where there exist international tribunals and hybrid do-
mestic/international tribunals, and now the world's first internationalized 
domestic tribunal, the IST, has been created. 
And let me again stress that this internationalized tribunal is not just 
getting assistance from the United States. There are many respected, inde-
pendent, non-governmental organizations around the world that are joining 
this process. And I think experts in this field have to ask themselves: Do 
they want to be like the UN Secretary General and stand on the side line and 
hurl criticisms, or do they want to get involved to try to help the tribunal be 
as fair as possible, so that in the words of Robert Jackson, the IST can "es-
tablish incredible events with credible evidence" and thereby facilitate rec-
onciliation and the rule oflaw in Iraq. 
Having distinguished defense counsel like Mr. Doebbler is a very im-
portant ingredient; and so is enlisting international experts to help train the 
IST judges. Having the Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
help the judges by providing research memoranda on very difficult legal 
questions will also be helpful. And despite the monumental challenges that . 
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such a case presents, I'm convinced that at the end of the day Saddam Hus-
sein will get his fair trial. Thank you. 
